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as any Greek polis ever did. If one then distinguishes between the Church as
it ideally is, and its corrupt actuality, then this seems close to Plato's
distinction at the end of the Republic between the ideal polis, to which we
must owe allegiance, although it may never exist on Earth, and the degraded
states which actually do exist. But such an ideal cannot function as a
community - in the manner of the Aristotelian polis - here and now, and
this is what Aristotle's, and Hauerwas and Pinches', communitarianism
seems to require.

Anthony Rudd
University of Bristol

Dieter Henrich
The Course of Remembrance and
Other Essays on Holderlin.
Ed. and foreword by Eckart Forster. Trans.
Taylor Carman and Abraham Anderson.
Stanford: Stanford University Press 1997.
Pp. 302.
US$45.00. ISBN 0-8047-2739-2.
The Course of Remembrance contains the bulk of Henrich's work on Holderlin, apart from his 1992 Der Grund im Bewu~stein: Untersuchungen zu
Holderlins Denken in Jena (1794 I 5). It consists of six essays on Holder lin's
philosophical thought plus the short 1986 book Der Gang des Andenkens (The
Course of Remembrance). The book and three of the essays date from the
mid-1980s. One essay, 'Holderlin in Jena', has been newly written for this
volume, and one essay is Henrich's classic 'Holderlin on Judgment and Being'
(1966) that established the depth ofHolderlin's involvement with philosophy.
Fundamental to Holderlin's project is his attempt to join a pantheist
skepticism, inspired by Jacobi, with a commitment, inspired by Kant and
Fichte, to the pursuit of freedom as an infinite ideal. Human beings live as Holderlin argued in 'Judgment and Being' - in the wake of a primordial
separation from unconditioned being, itself effected by an original judgment
(Ur-teil), or by the mysterious coming into existence of discursive consciousness out of mere natural life. They then cope with this separation by
simultaneously seeking both reunion with a lost unconditioned reality, often
through seeking merger with an object of love, and autonomy in the perfection and release oftheir powers of self-legislated judgment and action.
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Henrich's readings focus less on conclusions than on the dynamics of
formation of a body of thought, on arguments between contemporaries, and
on motives that are not transparent to authors (14-16). In the case of
Holderlin himself, this means focusing on how Holderlin as a student
experienced the conflict at the Tubingen Stift between Enlightenment
autonomism and traditional religious practices. It must be, as Holderlin put
it in a 1795 letter to Schiller, that 'subject and object [are] united in an
absolute that cannot [contra Fichte] be appropriately called an "I"' (83). Yet
we are also separated from this primordial unity and set upon the path of
autonomy, but set in such a way that, contra Hegel, we can never claim full
mastery of the conditions of expression of our subjectivity.
The key problem of Holder lin's work then becomes how to combine love
as abandonment of self and merger into a greater unity with autonomous
selfhood. Holderlin's sense of this problem motivates his famous Wechseltonlehre or theory of the continuous alternation of tones in poetry, according to
which 'the highest beauty of poetry, at least, is based on an ordered modulation of acts in which each of the tendencies of life is momentarily released'
(134). 'The tendencies of conscious life are mutually irreconcilable yet equally
legitimate and indispensable' (222).
Henrich argues that this way of thinking about subjectivity's life is
philosophically alive for us now. Successions of such modulated acts constitute a way of thinking that is aptly 'irreducible to any clear and distinct
understanding' (146). In such acts, we can see subjects 'engaged in active
remembering' (147) of the plights of subjectivity, rather than being thrown
on the path of some Heideggerian impersonal destiny.
Once one sees subjectivity as informed by necessarily conflicting tendencies, then one will tend to see - as Henrich notes Holderlin did come to see
- 'poetry alone [as] the locus of genuine transcendental insight' (222). A
reader animated by this thought, as Henrich is, will then trace closely a poet's
choices of words and swerves of interest and perception, assuming that
nothing else so fully expresses subjectivity's tendencies. This is exactly what
Henrich does in his reading ofHolderlin's 'Andenken' ('Remembrance'). The
title of Henrich's reading, 'The Course of Remembrance' thus invokes both
the course of the poem itself in all its details and the course of any effort at
remembering subjectivity's worldly situation, arguing that these two courses
are deeply interrelated: Holderlin's course in writing enacts the essence of
situated subjectivity.
In carrying out this reading Henrich is explicitly taking issue with both
Adorno's modernist interest in para taxes and ceasuras of form in Holderlin
and Heidegger's anti-modernist mythologizing ofHolderlin. Against Heidegger, Henrich holds that Holderlin in 'Remembrance' depicts a movement of
vision ofthe landscape from Bordeaux itself, rather than from Germany. On
the basis of detailed archival work on the topography of late 18th century
Bordeaux and its surrounding countryside, Henrich argues that 'the presence
of the city ... dominates the poem throughout' (186). The kind of awareness
that Holderlin achieves is here intimately bound up with a specific place, just
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as in the Wordsworthian notion of a genius loci: 'an ultimate insight [is bound
to] the place where the insight emerges' (229). In sum, and in contrast with
Heidegger's claim that the poet is claiming a future world-colonizing mission
for German poetry, in 'Remembrance' the poet gains 'clarity at the place of
departure farther out to sea [at the specific confluence of the Garonne and
the Dordogne], and in a form of understanding that allows him to comprehend what it means to be a poet in renunciation of the ocean and oflove. This
- the moral, the theme, and the course of the poem, all in one - ... looks
over [particular locations] in faithfulness and gratitude' (204).
Henrich has undoubtedly succeeded first in identifying in Holderlin's
poetry structures of attention to specific places and specific words that are
fundamental to the intelligence at work in lyric poetry, and second in
demonstrating the philosophical interest of this form of intelligence. After
reading Holderlin's lyrics expressing subjectivity's conflicting tendencies,
any other writing can come to seem pale and flat. Henrich shows well how
and why this is so. At times, however, Henrich seems to overstate an
opposition between form and thought. He claims that 'Holderlin's ideas ...
have more to do with the poem's structure and movement than with what it
says' (194). 'Our considerations have centered around an effort to give an
account of the structural form of Holderlin's poem' (242). In the grip of this
thought, he does not follow up allusions to Homer and Socrates in 'Remembrance', nor does he unpack the reference to 'Bellarmine /And his companions'. While Henrich is surely right to emphasize the specificities of place in
'Remembrance', it is less clear that his reading is fully rules out the readings
of either Heidegger or Adorno. It may well be that the relation between the
town of Bordeaux and the Garonne island (the 'place of departure') is
metaphorical for a relation between Germany and Bordeaux plus the
Garonne Island, as though the poem's protagonist, in imagining departure
from Bordeaux via the island were also imagining departure from Germany
via Bordeaux, as Heidegger suggests. The unity of the moments of remembering that Henrich emphasizes is not obviously incompatible with the
stuttering resistance to doctrinal paraphrase that Adorno suggests is central
to Holderlin's poetry. Henrich seems sometimes to focus so closely on the
structure of remembering that he loses sight of the play of moods in the
speaker. He notes, correctly, that there is a movement from loneliness and
muted anguish to a tragic calm that is unsupported by any sense of deliverance or by any expectation of an end to the darkness of the age (244). But he
does not say much about the possible causes of the initial loneliness and
anguish, either in Holderlin personally or, more importantly, in the social
structures of modernity.
In the end, however, one will, after reading Holder lin, often want to resist
both any full-blooded social explanation of plights of mind and any imagined
mythological solution to those plights. Here Henrich's continuing focus on
Holderlin's expression of situated subjectivity's conflicting tendencies is of
the first importance philosophically. The appearance of these essays in
English translation ought to have the effect of completely undoing the
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simplifications of contemporary scientistic philosophy of mind. It will probably not have this effect, since these simplifications are so well-entrenched.
But there is no other work that develops a counterphilosophy of mind so
powerfully.

Richard Eldridge
Swarthmore College

Robert A. Hillman
The Richness of Contract Law:
An Analysis and Critique of Contemporary
Theories of Contract Law.
Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers 1996.
Pp. xiv + 279.
US$115.00. ISBN 0-7923-4336-0.
In this book on contract theory, Hillman strives both to offer a comparative
overview of a variety oftheoretical perspectives and issues, and also to defend
his own theory of pragmatic common sense, which emphasizes the 'richness
and importance of contract law' and questions 'the utility of overly abstract
theories' (xiii). His thesis is that the perspectives he describes are overly rigid
and narrow and he asserts that it is possible, by selecting the valuable
insights of each, to construct a synthesizing 'consensus or pluralist thesis'
(267) which 'constitutes the most persuasive account of contract law's nature
and functions' (267).
In its survey of theoretical perspectives the book is informative and
descriptively insightful. It is written in a lively and engaging fashion, and
brings together in an accessible format a wide variety of theoretical issues in
contract law. It is an excellent introduction to the student or new comer in
this area and offers new and original insights to the more advanced scholar.
In its second goal, however, the book is notably less successful. In his closing
chapter Hillman acknowledges that his position may be perceived as antitheoretical and overly defensive of the status quo. If these criticisms continue
to have force, as they do, it is because Hillman does not engage in the truly
critical analysis of the theoretical positions and issues he describes that is
required to sustain either his rejection of those positions or his own purported
compromise. The theoretical assumptions of many of these positions are
accepted uncritically and the comparative discussion fails to distinguish
criticisms or weaknesses that fundamentally undermine a particular view
from those that require only modification or qualification of a position. There
is, in short, ultimately no delivery on the promise of a synthesizing new
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